Development studies as a field has undergone a fundamental change of subject matter since its inception in the first half of 20th century. An earlier post on this blog described the critiques that necessitated a reformulation of the goals of and techniques employed by development studies scholars. This post addresses the moral stance inherent in the modern reformulation of development studies and its consequences to the general applicability of the policy recommendations that stem from development studies theory.
The original focus of development studies was restricted to the economic development of hitherto underdeveloped regions of the world. Other aspects of human society like civil and political rights, income distribution and its relation to social structures, and environment externalities from development were of no concern to the policy recommendations advanced by the scholars. The view has changed radically since the late 20th-century impasse in development studies research. Goulet summarizes the newly expanded scope of development studies by invoking three basic needs that all development projects must aspire to meet for the population of the target regions – life sustenance, self-esteem, and freedom. The first, life sustenance is an extension of the economic development centered view of original scholars with a restatement that highlights the provision of basic physical needs of the population – food security, shelter and health services – as well as the support of human capital growth via primary education and development of employment opportunities. In concrete terms, this implies a renewed interest in ensuring some fairness in income distribution along with the overall economic growth of the nation. The second basic need of self-esteem applies to the nation as a whole and aims to provide a voice for the people of the nation on the increasingly integrated global forum. Concerns in this area include protection from exploitation by other nations, prevention of slavery, human trafficking and colonialism in both its evident and implicit forms, and creation of opportunity for true national growth in the context of global trade relations. The final basic need of freedom, returning to the personal realm, hints at the fruits of development that the promised upshot of the dimensions discussed so far – the expansion of personal freedom defined as an expansion of choice for the general population in the material, social and political arenas.
The three categories of concerns mentioned above can be seen to be layered in a way. Basic life sustenance needs must be met before a stable nation can exist and the concerns of a level playing ground on the international field arise. Similarly, basic needs and space for national growth are prerequisites for any sustained effort to expand personal freedoms. While these statements are generally correct, critical examination reveals that the three dimensions are interconnected more deeply. Expectations and levels of personal freedom often feed back into the political organization of the nation which affects the provision of basic needs and a sense of national pride. Thus, progress in each category builds on top of others and both development and underdevelopment in a category have positive feedback on other progress in other categories. The three categories can be seen to be hierarchical in a different way – in their moral content. The human needs described in each category is loaded with prescriptions for the morality of a “developed” society. Further, the scope and force of the prescription grow across the three categories described. Therefore, the latter category faces more counter-pressure from opposing voices that reject the implicit morality. The goal of meeting basic needs for life sustenance is, in theory, the most generally accepted, and the United Nations have developed several indicators of nations’ performance with regards to the provision of these basic needs like the Human Development Index and the Human Poverty Index. But even these efforts have met with stiff opposition from the neo-classical political institution ascendant across the developed world in the last quarter of the 20th century. Nations all over the world, have increasingly adopted economic policies of economic liberalization that have led to worsening of income inequality. An extension of the neo-classical bent in global eco-political leadership is the de-facto failure of all affirmative action to bolster the voice of under-developed nations in international organizations like the World Trade Organization and the United Nations. On the contrary, both the World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund have been criticized for forcing economic and political restructuring of indebted underdeveloped nations that, in all cases, contravenes these nations’ sovereignty and, in some cases, has been shown to be detrimental to the nations’ long-term progress. This failure to level the playing field internationally has reduced most efforts aimed at increasing under-developed nations’ self-esteem to inconsistent and oft-rescinded talking points.
The final concern of freedom is the most controversial in terms of its moral prescriptions, and because this dimension characterizes the end-goal of the other thrusts of development according to modern theory, it opens up a heated debate about the general applicability of development efforts entirely. Just like the early years of development studies, Northern scholars dominate the field, and as any discussion of the meaning and content of freedom and liberty demonstrates, is laden with moral judgments by these scholars that stem from their social context. The importance accorded to personal liberty in development literature often stands in opposition to existing religious and traditional fabric in eastern societies where individuality is subordinate to the observance of social roles and maintenance of familial cohesion. The assumption that expanded choice is synonymous with social progress is also opposed to ethics that prescribe a simple life as the good life and proscribe material access. This final point is particularly problematic for Amartya Sen’s operationalization of freedom-as-progress, where he extended utility theory in economics to encompass all the ways in which progress leads to peoples’ ability to fulfill a broader range of desires. Even the undisputed acceptance of democracy as the liberating form of self-governance is merely a preference often clothed as fact. A case in point is the difficulty faced when attempting to settle on a universal definition for human rights. Any such exercise is fraught with the risk of a stalemate due to conflicting moral views, and an eventual definition is likely a compromise that is yet a victory of the most politically vocal groups on the international stage, viz., the Northern states.
Notwithstanding these reservations, poverty, and inequality are real circumstances with dire consequences for those affected. The rich may endure the uncertainty of deconstruction, but the poor very well know what poverty feels like. So where to from here for development scholars? Do we dither in our definitions and circumscribe our recommendations to the detriment of pro-development politics (like the defeat of reasonable economics to the neo-liberal dogma), or do we risk the imposition of a moral code unwanted in those we seek to help? In my opinion, the pursuit of progress is a moral cause and an attempt at rendering the goals objective is doomed. We must accept the moral position we hold when we advocate for a certain kind of progress, revealing our biases front-and-center. Further, we should strive to encourage participation of the emancipated in defining what emancipation means for them, but within the moral standards already chosen. Finally, the tools and measurements employed can and should continue to be scientific, lending credibility to our achievements towards progress.
This article is a response to two essays in The Companion to Development Studies – Development and economic growth by A. P. Thirlwall and development and social welfare by Jeniffer A. Elliott.